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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MALCOLM N. McKINNON,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,
Cross-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
T H E CORPORATION OF T H E
P R E S I D E N T OF T H E CHURCH
OF J E S U S CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
P
'
Defendant-Respondent,
Cross-Appellant, j

Brief of Cross-Appellant and Respondent

STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE
. Plaintiff-appellant, and cross-respondent seeks
money damages against defendant-respondent, and
cross-appellant arising out of respondent's alleged
breach of contract to provide Appellant with a haulage
right-of-way to reach coal properties formerally operated by Appellant.
1
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R C O U R T
Respondent moved the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Ernest F . Baldwin,
Jr., presiding, for Summary Judgment. Said Motion
was based upon several separate points. At the hearing,
Appellant requested leave to file an Amended Complaint for the purpose of adding or substituting new or
additional parties defendant, and in addition, to include
a new cause of action. The Court granted Respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment on three separate
grounds, and further denied Appellant's Motions to
amend his complaint.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON C R O S S - A P P E A L
Defendant-Respondent, and Cross-Appellant contends that its Motion for Summary Judgment should
have been granted on the additional points presented to
the lower court. Defendant-Respondent, and Cross-Appellant prays that this Court order that the lower court
should have granted Summary Judgment on the following grounds:
1. That the preliminary negotiations between the
parties did not constitute a binding contract.
2. That the alleged contract is void for failure to
comply with the Utah Statute of Frauds.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For many years Appellant was the owner of certain
coal properties located in Emery County, State of Utah.
Respondent is a Utah corporation sole.
During the late 1950s Appellant approached Mr.
Leonard F . Adams, Chairman of the Coal Committee
of the General Church Welfare Committee concerning
the possible purchase of the entire coal properties owned
by Appellant. (McArthur Deposition, pg. 8) The purchase of the entire property was never consumated, however, in February, 1959, a 480 parcel of the property
being offered was purchased for the sum of $264,000.00.
(McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D - l ) .
Since only a portion of Appellant's property was
purchased, Appellant proposed in a letter dated March
17,1959, (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D-2), that he
withdraw his application for a Bureau of Land Management lease for 640 acres of federal coal land, located
immediately west of the original 480 acre plot which had
been purchased. This was to enable the purchaser of the
480 acre parcel to apply for a lease to the adjoining
property.
At about this time, Appellant expressed a concern
about the existence of a fault lying within his property
and running toward the federal land. He, therefore,
suggested that if the fault were found to extend as far
as the federal land, and if it became too expensive to
cross through said fault, that he be granted a right-ofway through a portion of the federal lease so as to permit
3
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him access to go around the fault and to continue his
mining operations on the opposite side of the fault. (McKinnon Deposition, pg. 10).
Preliminary negotiations, conversations, and correspondence relating to the granting of the alleged rightof-way did take place. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibits
D-2, D-3, D-4, D-9 and D-10, Exhibit A, pg. 7 and 8).
No oral agreement was ever consumated between the
parties, and no written document was ever prepared or
signed by Respondent corporation, or by an agent thereof, setting forth the terms of the alleged obligation to
provide a right-of-way. Appellant himself has admitted
that the negotiations were never consummated. (Exhibit
A, pgs. 11 and 12; McKinnon Deposition, pg. 39).
On June 18, 1959, Cooperative Security Corporation, a Utah corporation, by and through its President,
Henry D. Moyle, made application with the United
States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management for a lease to the 640 acres of federal coal land.
(Exhibit A, pg. 13). On March 1, 1962, said lease was
granted by the Bureau of Land Management to Cooperative Security Corporation. (Exhibit A, pg. 18).
On December 6, 1966, Cooperative Security Corporation, the owner of the 480 acres, and also the lessee
of the federal leased land, granted an option to Peabody
Coal Company. (R. 102). Upon learning of such transaction, Appellant, for the first time in approximately six
years, wrote a letter dated February 16,1967 addressed
to the Frist Presidency of the Church, calling attention
4
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to the prior discussions and to the fact that such negotiations had not been concluded. (Exhibit A, pg. 11). Subsequent negotiations were then carried on in an attempt
to resolve the matter, however, it was never resolved to
the satisfaction of the Appellant.
On June 1, 1968, Appellant granted an option of
his property to the same Peabody Coal Company, which
option was subsequently exercised by said company resulting in a long term lease between Appellant and Peabody Coal Company, whereby Appellant is to receive a
minimum of $3,000 per month until such time as he has
received the total sum of $540,000.00, thereafter, the
minimum would be the sum of $10,000.00 per year. (R.
103). On April 12, 1972, the date the lawsuit was commenced, Appellant neither possessed nor operated the
property upon which the fault existed, and therefore had
no need for the right-of-way.

A R G U M E N T ON C R O S S - A P P E A L
POINT I
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D IN F A I L I N G
TO G R A N T R E S P O N D E N T ' S M O T I O N F O R
S U M M A R Y J U D G M E N T ON T H E G R O U N D
THAT ALL PRELIMINARY
NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING T H E GRANTING OF
T H E R I G H T - O F - W A Y F A I L E D TO C R E A T E
A B I N D I N G CONTRACT B E T W E E N T H E
PARTIES.
5
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I t is a fundamental in the law of contracts that
before an agreement may become valid, be it written
or oral, that there must be a mutual assent to all of
the terms of the contract, or a "meeting of the minds."
The essential terms of the contract must be " . . . spelled
out either expressly or impliedly with sufficient defiiniteness to be enforced." Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d
61, 362 P 2d 427 (1961). In an earlier case entitled
Price v, Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 Pac. 767 (1906), being
an action to compel specific performance of a parol
agreement, the Utah Supreme Court held:
This contract must be complete and certain in its
terms; and 'this element of completeness' must
exist in every contract which can be specifically
enforced, whatever be its external form whether
written or verbal, whether embodied in the memorandum required by the Statute of Frauds, or
rendered obligatory by part performance, or by
any other act which may obviate the provisions of
that statute.
In addition, the burden of proving such assent and
definiteness of terms lies upon the party who claims
the existence of a contract. B. & R. Supply Company
v. Bringkurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P 2d 1216, (1972).
In the case at bar, Appellant has attempted to
establish the existence of a valid contract, claiming
that several documents read collectively constitute a
binding contract or obligation to grant a right-of-way.
A summary of the documents relied upon by the Appellant are as follows:
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1. A letter dated March 12, 1959 from Mr.
Leonard Adams of the General Church Welfare Committee to the Appellant. (Exhibit

A,pg.l).
There is no mention in this letter concerning
the granting of a right-of-way.
2. A letter dated March 17, 1959 from Appellant to Mr. Leonard Adams of the General
Church Welfare Committee. (McKinnon
Deposition, Exhibit D-2).
The letter states as follows:
I would like to present a proposition, wherein
the Church applies for the acreage I asked for
in my lease modification, along with other
acreage suitable to Church use, and after the
lease is granted, assigns to me a portion of the
land I applied for in my lease modification. I
need a portion of this land in order to develop
a practical haulageway to the west that will
go around the fault that is running in a southwesterly direction and could cut me off if I do
not have some additional land to the south.
(Emphasis added.)
3. A letter dated April 15, 1959 from Leonard
E . Adams to Henry D. Moyle. The letter
reads in part as follows:
Should be pleased to discuss this matter
(right-of-way) with you with view to determining whether or not the Church could consistently grant the American Fuel Company
access to any of the Government Land which
the Church expects to lease from the Government provided it was necessary for the Amer-

7
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ican Fuel Company to have access to such
acreage. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D 5).
4. A letter from Frank Armstrong, Appellant's
attorney dated January 6, 1960 to Henry D,
Moyle, states as follows:
I talked to you some time ago just prior to the
death of Leonard E. Adams regarding an
appointment to meet with Brother Adams
and Malcolm N. McKinnon to arrange the
granting of a right-of-way to Mr. McKinnon
over a portion of the land the Church was obtaining by lease from the Federal government and to arrange for a contribution to the
church out of the money to be paid Mr. McKinnon for a portion of his mine. (Emphasis
added.) (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit D9).
5. A letter dated February 8,1961 from Appellant to Henry D. Moyle which states as follows :
While there is no immediate rush to conclude
this matter, I have been holding a sizeable
donation for the Church. I want to turn this
over to you at the time you give me a letter
stating that: In the event I should require additional land to make it possible to go around
the end of the faults that might otherwise prevent me from being able to extract the coal
from land lying west of the faults, the Church
would agree to make it available. This is in
accord with the understanding you had with
Mr. Armstrong. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 8).
8
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6. A letter dated November 30, 1961 from Appellant's attorney to Henry D. Moyle states
as follows:
When Malcolm N. McKinnon sold a part of
his mine to the Church, I talked to you about
a right-of-way to get into some of his leased
property if, because of faults, he couldn't get
to it from his present workings.
7. An envelop containing two checks, totalling
$14,000.00 from Appellant payable to The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Said checks were to be held until negotiations
for right-of-way were completed. These
checks have never been cashed. (McKinnon's
Deposition Exhibits D-3 and D-4) Written
upon envelop was the following:
"Hold: Two checks totalling $14,000.00.
Malcolm McKinnon tendered for right-ofway. This matter is pending." (R. 99).
8. A letter dated September 17, 1969 from Alfred W. Uhrhan to the Appellant. Part of the
letter reads as follows:
The two checks were handed to me personally
by the late President Moyle with the instructions to hold them until the details of the
right-of-way were worked out with the mine
management. . . . At that time, Brother
Leonard E . Adams was still alive and in
charge of the mine. However, he was ailing,
and it is obvious that the matter was not finalized at that time. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 7).
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According to Appellant's own admission, the foregoing enumerated documents constitute all of the
documents relied upon by the Appellant to show the
existence of a contract requiring Respondent to convey
a right-of-way. (R. 98 & 99). It is obvious from a
review of these documents that there is no "meeting
of the minds." The only assumption which may be
gleaned therefrom is that preliminary negotiations on
the possible granting of a right-of-way were held. This
court held in Valcarce, supra at page 428 " . . . that where
there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that
a contract might be entered into in the future, the court
cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought
to have made and enforce it."
A collective reading of all of the documents relied
upon by the Appellant fail to mention the location,
nature, extent or duration of the proposed right-of-way.
There are no documents which were prepared by either
Appellant or Respondent, or their agents which indicate
that Appellant in fact agreed to or consented to the
terms of a purported right-of-way.
Appellant, in his deposition on the 28th day of
June, 1972, himself admitted that the negotiations were
never consummated. H e states beginning on Page 39 as
follows:
Well, let's say prior to the time that you leased to
Peabody Coal Company we were waiting for you
to give us in writing something to establish the
fact that we were to have the right to go around.
. . . (Emphasis Added.)
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I t was to be a donation to be held and not cashed
until such time as the leases could be issued and
some written document given to me assuring me
that if the faults extended into your property, I
could go into your property far enough with my
entries to go around the end of the fault. . . .
Q. I see. And if we did not give you the written
document, we were not to cash the checks ?
A. If I didn't get the written documents, you
weren't to cash the checks. (Pages 40-41).
A. If they had given me a letter stating that I
could go if I needed it, Yes.
Q. But if they failed or refused to give you that
letter, they were not entitled to the $14,000.00?
A. No. (Page 42).
The checks were never cashed.
I t is clear that at the end of the negotiations, there
was, at best, an agreement to make a contract at some
future date, pending the satisfactory negotiation of
additional terms of the contract. An agreement to agree
at a future date does not constitute a contract, and to
so hold would be in contravention of long standing
precedents in this and other jurisdictions.
Hi-Way
Motor Co. v. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 Pac.
133 (1926); Slayter v. Palsey, 199 Ore. 616, 264 P2d
444 (1953); Western Airlines, Inc. v. Lathrop Company, 499 P2d 1013, (Alaska 1972).
The applicable law in this case is, therefore, clear:
That where there are mere negotiations moving toward
the making of a contract, and where there is no evi11
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dence of an actual ' 'meeting of the minds" as to the
essential and material terms of the contract, there is no
contract between the parties.
Based upon these facts, the lower court should
have held that there was no binding contract in existence, and properly should have granted Respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment on that basis.
POINT II
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D IN F A I L I N G
TO G R A N T R E S P O N D E N T ' S M O T I O N F O R
S U M M A R Y J U D G M E N T ON T H E G R O U N D
T H A T T H E A L L E G E D CONTRACT F A I L E D
TO COMPLY W I T H T H E U T A H S T A T U T E
OF FRAUDS.
A. A N O R A L A G R E E M E N T F O R T H E
G R A N T I N G O F A R I G H T - O F - W A Y TO L A N D
IS VOID.
The Utah Statute of Frauds renders all oral executory agreements for the sale of an interest in land void.
Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
L E A S E S AND CONTRACTS FOR INT E R E S T I N L A N D S : Every contract for the
leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
12
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the party b\ w Ji*»i>• (he lease IT -*.oe I> J- • -e made,
or by his lawiol ;i^'itl thereunto authorized in
writ in ir.
Ii. 1971, the Utah Supreme C o m ' U>. JFcIh r,
Marc us, 25 Utah 2d 242, 480 P ;M UMi , 1**7 1 >. defined "any interest in lands" for purpose of applying
the Statute of F r a u d s to include the right to run a pipeline <»wr n,r ii,:*! ..f another. This affirms the rule of
i::\* adapted h\ Uu jurisdictions which previously
defined "interest
•-.;.
trM*Ju«K- easements a n d
specifically rights-of-way. tSij/mnsi^
1/ Duiitrfrf,

.-::t. DOC :UMENfJ6 lU^lUJJ UPON
TO TAKI TDK CASE OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO
CONSTITI JTE A k M E M O R A N D I JM I N W R I T ING."
'"V U4-"!; SlaiuN of F - n i d , PM ides that a onitract lor an interest in land is vuiil unless evidenced by
a " . . . note or memorandum thereof
'« criling
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
!. writing." Utah Code Annotated, Serf ion •>•>-% :i
1D.VJ.
The U t a h Supreme (<•>;»{ -MS . : . . ^ I M-HI-M-U
that the n«'i< or memoranrunt rehed upon to establish
. ;!Ui! agrenncni u-- diffidently definite so as to
establish the terms of the agreement, n d n addition,
U:-:M contain all the '-sxonlial terms and provision^ A
13
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the contract. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refinery Co., 121
Utah 412, 242 P2d 578, (1952); Collett v. Goodrich,
119 Utah 662, 231 P 2d 730 (1951).
Not one of the documents relied upon by the Appellant in the matter before the court bear the signature
of the Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, nor any authorized
agent thereof. In fact there are no documents which
constitute an agreement, which have been signed by
any agent of any Church entity. Accordingly, the provisions of the Utah Statute of Frauds have not been
complied with, and the purported contract should be
held to be void.
The lower court should have held that the purported contract between the parties was void for not having
complied with the Utah Statute of Frauds.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT W A S CORRECT IN
GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
S U M M A R Y J U D G M E N T ON T H E G R O U N D
THAT APPELLANT WAS SUING T H E
WRONG DEFENDANT.
The Appellant contends that the Corporation of
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints is the proper defendant in this action. Re14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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spouflrm i !;iiin- -n u di^ !<.\wr eoi.-i. found that said
corporation - t.nf M I : ?H * defendant, rather the
Cooperative Si**-urit\ Corporation should have been
named as ^n- pmp< \ defendant.
Tin i'iirp'M-.'iiMMi of the Preside) ' . (:., n i u m .
•>\ J.-^Jis i lii-isi .-.j" Latter-Day Saints is A l 7 tah corporation <oh organized , n d existing pu:>uant to the
provision*- I' Section M* : i Mirough 11, inclusive, U t a h
Code Annotated, 1953, a^ amended ^ueli corporation,
as a corporation sole, consists of one individual namely,
the President »>f ih" n^v-ch of Jesus Christ ..* L.-MterD a y Saints.
Anp^M .\:i lias stated in h'* Hru f* : h, i . ;] ontacts
during the formation of the purported agreement were
with representatives, agents, or employees of the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ
of L a t t e r - D a y Saints. Appellant further states that
at no J MII* did IN- ha\e any contact " ith employees or
representatn rs ,.f Cooperative Secur.ty Corporation.
This is not true. There were initial < nversations !.Mi
Leonard Adams and Alfred W . C h r ^ m : however die
person with whom Appellant negotiated was H e n r y D.
Moyle. There is no evidence to show that H e n r y I ) ,
Movie was acting as a representative, agent
r employee - - \spondent corporation. Although H e n r y
D . J\I*>\ ie \* ;.\ ,: memher of the First Presidency of the
Chin ^ furing the entire period <•!* tim. .if negotiations,
he was also the President of Cooperative Security Corporation. (Exhibit A. m>
15
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At no time has the Respondent corporation owned
or held a leasehold interest in the property over which
the alleged right-of-way was to have been granted.
On June 18, 1959, Henry D. Moyle, as President of
Cooperative Security Corporation, a Utah corporation,
pursuant to a Resolution by the Board of Directors, filed
an Application with the Bureau of Land Management
of the United States Government to acquire a lease of
the 640 acres through which the alleged right-of-way
would have been granted. (Exhibit A, pg. 13). Subsequent thereto, on March 1, 1962, a lease was issued by
the Bureau of Land Management to Cooperative Security Corporation. (Exhibit A, pg. 18). Due to the fact
that Respondent corporation has never held an interest
in the property in question, nor contracted with Appellant, there cannot be any breach of an alleged contract
by the Respondent to convey an interest in the property.
Appellant himself had adequate knowledge of the
proper party to this action, and in no way was misled
by Respondent. In a letter dated February 13, 1962
Appellant was advised as follows:
You are familiar with the fact that the Cooperative Security Corporation recently obtained for
the Deseret Coal Mine leases on two tracts of
Government coal land. . . . (Emphasis Added.)
(Exhibit A, pg. 19).
On June 18, 1968 Appellant was advised in a letter
that if a right-of-way were to be granted, it would be
between himself and Cooperative Security Corporation.
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way agreement that might be entered between yourself
and Cooperative Security Corporation!'
(Emphasis
added) (Exhibit A. PIT :'0 •.
Ii:i*s- a- answer !o Respondent's Interrogators .V>. *j,s. altliough attempting to include *V R e
spondent corporation, admits that the granting of the
alleged right-of-way would have to be in fhr name of
Cooperative Security Corporation.
(R. ioh
/// Interrogators Xn jft Ippellant further admits thai he
wits nu an ,"/ tin jart H.^i Cooperative Security Corporation hail a leasehold interest in the subject
property
as early as December /,'. v.w, / R. ] r<*
It i> InndanieiiUn thai where •. -<»rporation is the
VK-I] [i; ri. ;o inures! a should he sued \v its corporate
name. Article X I I , Section I « i (IK * la • Cor
provides ill pari as' f'*1!'^ ••
All corporations shall have lh« right to su<\ and
shall be subject to be sued ; H •< urt- a K l e
cases as natural persons.
Section 16-10-k l"ui- i «MJC Annobth ,]. m">3. further
provides that corporations enn Mir and lw -..ii-d MI Uicir
corporate name.
Cooperative Seenrif \ Corporation W.-JS incorporated
in the State cf I'tah u April 22. i**.*: uui .since that
date has been authorized to do business in the State of
I Jtah (Exhibit A - P a g e 21). As owner of the W s e 17
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hold interest in the subject property, and by virtue of
the fact that all negotiations concerning the alleged
right-of-way were conducted with the President of
said corporation, Cooperative Security Corporation is
the proper defendant in this action, not the Corporation
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints.
To contend, as does Appellant, that the President
of the Church can control various entities and, therefore, become subject to suit for all such business transactions, clearly ignores the laws of the State of Utah
pertaining to corporations. To carry such assertion to
the results desired by appellant would be to suggest
that all suits involving the Deseret Book Company,
Hotel Utah, Beneficial Life Insurance Company, Bonneville Interntaional, Cooperative Security Corporation, and many other church related corporations could
be sued by suing the Corporation of the President.
The lower court was, therefore, correct in holding
that the lawsuit commenced by the Appellant was in
fact commenced against the wrong party, and the granting of Summary Judgment on this ground was correct.
POINT II
T H E L O W E R COURT CORRECTLY H E L D
T H A T APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION
IS B A R R E D BY T H E U T A H STATUTE OF
L I M I T A T I O N S (SECTION 78-12-25, U T A H
CODE A N N O T A T E D , 1953).
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Section Jb 12 'J.*- I ta!s i ode Annoiaied. i:*V},
entitled "Within .
years", establishing a four year
Statute of limitation j>'-o\id(»s in p o t a.s follows:
A n action no.a .[ r -en-aH, obligation ••• ;;amlity
not founded upon ji
^ h u m e n t i n writing, . . ,
B y virtue of !;.e fad that there is no instrument in
writing establishing the agreement between the parties,
the above-nKM11ioncd Statute ^ ! -imitations is control 1 .,:••
ihr ea-'e of T. •••,! (Inntcc luntrh Cfnnf.Ht)!/-1 -v.
Erickson, 82 Utaii 475, 25 P 2 d 952, (1933) the I ' n h
Supreme Court held Hiaf an aelion for specific performance of an oral contract or agreement to convey
land which was commenced over live years after the
execution of a deed was barred by the four year Statute
of Limitation-. The Supreme (Our* further held iliat
the cause of .leiion <-i a^li! n- MIC ar*-a (he moment an
action may be maintained !•• enforce it, and thai 'lie
Statute of Limitations is then set in motion. See also
State Taoc Commission vs. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177,
100 P2(I 575. ! 1940), and (T//e/V w h'-nivalis. 2l\ T>ah
2d 355, tori lK2d 799 MO*
Appellant admits m JJIS Aiesvvej i -u>ponucnt s
Interrogatories N o . 7 that the contract. >r oI)iigatiou In
provide a right-of-wa ; . first came into existence on
March ! . !'*<•; *j. the* dale tin- l e ^ e »\.-.-, obtained from
the Bureau f ! .oid Managemcnl. <'• ? ; a! d. ; te ( o
operative Security Corporation was JM a position it r
•< Hi-st time to grant a H<jaV-°f v^a\ n> Appellant •!'
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in fact an obligation so to do existed. According to the
foregoing cases, a cause of action therefore arose on
March 1, 1962, and a four year Statute of Limitations
was then set in motion. This cause of action was initiated by the Appellant by the service of a summons
upon the Respondent on April 12, 1972. This is in
excess of 10 years following the commencement of the
cause of action and the start of the running of the
Statute of Limitations. Therefore under any theory or
under any Statute of Limitations, Appellant's cause
of action would be barred.
Appellant admits in answer to Respondent's Interrogatory No. 14 that Respondent's failure to perform the contract took place on December 9, 1966
when Respondent through Cooperative Security Corporation entered into a lease or option agreement with
Peabody Coal Company and failed in said agreement
to reserve the right-of-way for Appellant's use. Appellant also states in answer to Respondent's Interrogatory No. 13 that his first demand for performance
was made by letter on February 16, 1967. (R. 102)
I n response to Respondent's Interrogatory No. 16,
requesting the date the Appellant claims that a cause
of action arose against the Respondent the Appellant
stated as follows:
On March 17, 1967 by virtue of a letter from
Wilford W . Kirton, Jr., counsel for Defendant
addressed to plaintiff denying any obligation or
arrangement on behalf of defendant to provide
plaintiff the right-of-way.
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T h e courL can a«/ctpi ;o \ -t
by the Appellant as the chile lhe
and the same is still barred I >;.
of Limitations, as provided f
Uhih Code Annotated. i(.*v;

tin .i.'Us relied ;:poii
WIUM ol ;ietion arose,
?ir
H \<;U- Malute
<h ^eeihm ?^-L'-:V),

\ppell;in\ :i: Ins Hric-f. ]i;is attempted f ; * laim
that the Respondent is precluded from asserting a
defense of the Statute of Limitations on the ground
that there existed a fiduciary or confidential relationship
between the parties. Appellant failed to assert t h e
claim of ;. confidential relationship at the time of the
taking of Ins depositor or at the lime of answering the
Interrogatories. It w>idd appear a*- Miongh the A p pellant \< now attempting to assert a nrw defense in
order to combat the obvious running of the Statute
of Limitaations. A further treatment of the argument
concerning the fiduciary relationship ••* -:t K- i ' , " , i , '"|
in Point I I I of our Brief.
i ML io\\cr court \.u. »*niiii MI i* i..inii; uuit the
foor '.ear Statute of Limitations controlled and the action by the Appellant is therefore barred.
POIN'i
A . \ i i i u i L i i U i i liJLJL^v i I O N S H I P , L u N S T R U C T I V E TRUST, OR R E L I A N C E U P O N
I N T K K N A L C H U R C H G R I E V A N C E PI? .OCED U K E S C E A S E D T O E X I S T M O R E 1 T I IA N
FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT n v T H I S ACTION, AND THERETO!* Iv
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R E S P O N D E N T IS NOT E S T O P P E D FROM
ASSERTING A DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
A review of the correspondence will show that
during the period immediately following the conveyance of the property by the Respondent to Peabody
Coal Company that any alleged fiduciary relationship;
right to rely upon a constructive trust; utilization of
internal grievance procedures; or the right to rely upon
conduct of the Respondent constituting an estoppel
ceased and terminated.
A series of letters show that legal procedures, not
church procedures, were resorted to.
On August 23, 1967 in a letter from Appellant
to President Tanner of the First Presidency of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, attention
is called to the fact that the letter was prepared at the
request of legal counsel for the Church and sent to
the Appellant's legal counsel. (Exhibit A - Page 23).
On September 14, 1967, Appellant was advised that
all future requests or negotiations would be handled
by legal counsel for the church. (Exhibit A - Page 24).
In his response, Appellant, on September 21, 1967
stated that all future negotiations would be presented
to the Church's legal counsel. (Exhibit A - Page 25).
This correspondence clearly shows that the parties were
proceeding through normal, legal channels and utilizing
legal counsel rather than relying upon the special fiduciary relationship existing between the parties.
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In a letter dated October 10, 1967 to Mr. Kirton,
legal counsel to the Church, Appellant, after complaining about the conduct of the Church as it applied to
him, stated as follows:
I feel that the treatment I have recently received,
after working closely in the past with the Church
for many years in connection with coal-mining
and coal-lands, is definitely wrong. It is my opinion that I have not only been used for the
Church's benefit, but I have been betrayed outright. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 28).
By November 9, 1967, the Appellant apparently
recognizing that his personal requests had been refused,
made a personal appeal to President Tanner for a
meeting with him, stating that the lowest type of criminals are given a chance to be heard. H e further stated:
It seems to me that you have closed all doors, but
I am asking you one more time; can you not meet
with me personally and try to arbitrate this matter harmoniously together? (Exhibit A, pg. 29).
President Tanner responded that he would be willing
to meet with Appellant but further stated in his letter
of November 14, 1967 as follows:
Having arranged for Brother Wilford W. Kirton, our legal counsel, to discuss the matter with
you, I was of the opinion that you had been given
a hearing and his explanation of your requests
was such as to make it impossible for us to meet
them. (Exhibit A, pg. 30).
The meeting was apparently held but not to the satisfaction of the Appellant. On February 6, 1968, the
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Appellant wrote a letter to the Bureau of Land Management, in essence "turning Respondent in" for
alleged misconduct in securing the leases. In the letter
the Appellant stated:
I hereby file a formal protest against the L.D.S.
Church assigning, selling, sub-letting, or altering
the ownership or right to operate and produce
coal. . . from designated leases. (Exhibit A, pg.
31).
On February 27, 1968 Appellant once again complained about the improper treatment received by him,
and then, in no uncertain terms, makes it clear that
he was no longer placing any trust in representatives
of the Respondent. The letter in part states as follows:
. . . I am now of the opinion that the Church was
intending to sell their coal-lands to Peabody, as
far back as this, and were just using me to help
the matter along. . . .
I t seems strange that the death of so few could
change the policy of the Church so much.
. . . but in each case received a rebuff and was
treated as though I were trying to use the Church
for my own benefit.
Instead of me using the Church, it seems the
Church used and deceived me, and then, in the
end, secretly betrayed me altogether. (Emphasis
Added.) (Exhibit A, pg. 37).
On March 15, 1968, counsel for the Church replied
to the Appellant's preceding letter by stating:
I think it is very unfortunate that you believe the
Church used and deceived you and secretly betrayed you altogether. . . .
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Beyond this, The First Presidency have concluded and I am under instructions to inform you that
it has no moral obligation to you and is unable to
grant your request. (Exhibit A, pg. 40).
All of the foregoing correspondence took place
more than four years prior to the commencement of
this action. The foregoing establishes hostility on behalf
of the Appellant and completely obliterates any claim
that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed
subsequent to that date. These letters show that the
Appellant was advised, and accepted the direction that
all negotiations would be through legal counsel rather
than Church grievance procedures. The Appellant
was advised and understood that his claim was not
being recognized. H e therefore made further appeals
for reconsideration. H e finally concluded to take formal
action by filing a protest with the Bureau of Land
Management. Under such circumstances, and conduct,
it is inconceivable how Appellant could claim conduct
on behalf of the Respondent constituting an estoppel.
Nor could he any longer contend that Respondent was
recognizing his claim, thus constituting a constructive
trust.
The Appellant in his letters acknowledges that he
was on notice that his claim had been denied by Respondent at a time more than four years before commencement of this lawsuit. Thus, adopting a theory pertaining to the Statute of Limitations most liberal to the
Appellant, the action is still barred.
The Affidavit of the Appellant to the effect that
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he believed he was dealing with "a direct representative
of God" and for Appellant to question such agents
"would be heresy" can hardly be classified as an affidavit of facts as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rather, it appears to be statements of conclusions and afterthought statements of the Appellant's
mental attitude at the time. There is no reference in
the affidavit to any facts sustaining the conclusions now
asserted by the Appellant.
Likewise, the Appellant failed to assert the claim
of a confidential relationship at the time of the taking
of his deposition and in answer to interrogatories concerning any defense to the Statute of Frauds or Statute
of Limitations.
The actual conduct of Appellant shows that he
openly and critically challenged representatives of the
church and further threatened to expose such "agents of
diety,. This conduct is far more persuasive than belated
self-serving statements in his affidavit.
In a letter dated July 30,1968 to President Tanner
the Appellant made it clear that he considered any further compromise negotiations at a close and stated that
he intended to seek relief in the courts. Part of that
letter is as follows:
The Church has severely damaged me, and those
of you who are presently in control of the Church
seem to lack the qualities advocated by the Church
to settle this on a moral basis even though, in my
opinion, it puts the Church in a position of being
guilty of preaching one thing and yet practicing
another.
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I have tried for nearly 18 months to get this matter settled in a fair and amicable way, but all you
have done from the beginning, in my opinion, is
to try to find a way out without making a fair
settlement, regardless of the damage you have
done to me.
I have been in business for myself for approximately 38 years, and to the best of my recollection
I have never been treated so shabbily.
In view of all that has transpired I consider that
you have left me no alternative but to seek relief
in the courts. So, unless you can come up with
something that is more realistic and of some value
to me, I herewith advise you that my next move
will be to file an action in court, to try and recover
damages. (Emphasis Added.) (Exhibit A, pg.
46).
A short time later the Appellant delivered a letter
to th eEditor of the Salt Lake Tribune, Mr. Will Fehr,
asking the letter be published as a news item, exposing
the Church and its officers. On August 19, 1968, the
Appellant wrote to Mr. A. C. Deck, Executive Editor
of the Tribune, calling attention that the letter had
been delivered to Mr. Fehr and again requesting that
the letter be published as a news item. If the paper
were unwilling to publish it, the Appellant then stated
that he was willing to pay for it to be published by any
department or whatever section of the paper for which
it would qualify. H e concluded his letter as follows:
I will appreciate your giving this you attention as
soon as conveniently possible, because I intend to
see to it that this matter is brought before the at-

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tention of the public by whatever means I find
necessary. (Exhibit A, pg. 47).
On August 26, 1968 Appellant wrote to J . W .
Gallivan, Publisher, Salt Lake Tribune, in which he
stated as follows:
I also wonder if you fully realize what consequences could develop as a result of your refusal
to publish this letter.
In my opinion, this letter covers points of utmost
importance to most members of the L.D.S.
Church, and it is also my opinion that the members of the Church should be made aware of how
matters of this nature are presently being handled. (Exhibit A, pg. 48).
Such conduct by Appellant clearly demonstrates
that his belated Affidavit is a sham. Obviously, there
existed no fiduciary, or other confidential relationship
between the parties which would estop the Respondent
from asserting a defense of the Statute of Limitations.
P O I N T IV
T H E L O W E R COURT W A S CORRECT IN
GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
S U M M A R Y J U D G M E N T ON T H E G R O U N D
T H A T T H E ISSUE OF DAMAGES W A S
E I T H E R MOOT OR N O T S U S C E P T I B L E T O
LEGAL DETERMINATION.
I t is clearly proper and within the discretion of
the lower court to rule on an issue of mootness as a
matter of law.
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Appellant contends that it was improper for the
lower court to rule on the issue of damages, claiming
that it is "within the province of the jury" to decide
matters of fact relating to the assessment of damages.
However true this may be generally, in the case before
the court, the issue is not the authority of the lower
court to assess and rule on the actual amount of damages, but rather, the authority of the lower court to
rule, as a matter of law, as to whether the Appellant
has a justifiable cause of action for damages.
It is settled law that it is the duty of every judicial
tribunal to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect. Paul v. Milk Depots*
Inc., 41 Cal Rptr 468, 396 P2d 924 (1964). This precludes the court having to rule on moot questions of
law or fact which ultimately have no practical effect
in settling the litigant's rights. ..Smith v. Smith, 304
P2d 421 (Ore., 1956).
In the recent case of Kellch v. Westland Minerals
Corp., 26 Utah 2d 42, 484 P2d 726 (1971), the Utah
Supreme Court held that where the Court was unable
to effect the rights of the parties the issue was moot
and therefore the appeal was dismissed.
In the instant case, as in Kellch, supra., both the
Appellant and Respondent have disposed of the property in question to Peabody Coal Company. Initially,
Cooperative Security Corporation conveyed an option
to Peabody Coal Company. Thereafter the Appellant
leased his adjacent property to Peabody Coal Company
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on a 30 year lease, where Appellant is to receive at
least the sum of $540,000. The presence or absence
of the alleged right-of-way became insignificant, inasmuch as Peabody Coal Company would then own
not only the property containing the fault, but also the
property over which the alleged right-of-way was to
have run.
H a d the Appellant received less money from Peabody Coal Company by virtue of the fact that he was
unable to provide the alleged right-of-way over the
property, he would then have had a clear issue of
damages, which properly should have gone to the jury.
By the Appellant's own admissions, the presence or
absence of the right-of-way had no effect on the price
he ultimately received upon the lease of the property.
On Page 76 of Appellant's Deposition we read in part
as follows:
Q. Was there any adjustment in the price in the
ultimate deal made with Peabody by virtue of the
fault problem that is the subject matter of this
lawsuit?
A. No.
Q. There was none?
A. (indicating affirmatively).
By Appellant's own admission, and by virtue of
his having leased his property for a substantial sum of
money " . . . without any diminution in price to the
owner of the property through which the alleged rightof-way was to be granted, makes the issue of damages
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either moot or not susceptible to legal determination."
(Amended Order - Page 10). For this reason the lower
court was correct in granting Respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Another reason why the issue of damages is moot
is because the entire contract is conditional. If the fault
were found to extend into the federal land, then, and
only then was a right-of-way to be used. On pages 40
and 41 of Appellant's Deposition, Appellant admitted
that ". . . if the faults extended into your property, I
could go into your property far enough with my entries
to go around the end of the fault." (Emphasis Added)
In answer to Respondent's Interrogatories No. 8 and
10, Appellant admits that the granting of the right-ofway was conditional. (R. 100 and 101). As of the date
the Appellants Deposition was taken, he had no knowledge as to whether or not the fault did in fact extend into
the federal property. (McKinnon Deposition, pg. 33
and 37).
Section 251 of the Restatement of Contracts provides in part as follows:
(1) Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition
occurs or is excused.
(2) If the condition has not been excused, its
nonoccurrence discharges the duty where the
condition can no longer occur.
As of the time the Appellant entered into his agreement with Peabody Coal Company, it had not been
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determined that the fault did, in fact, extend into such
property. Since there has been no occurrence of the
condition precedent, or any assurance that the condition
will ever be fulfilled there is no way of assessing damages, if any, which Appellant would have suffered.
Accordingly, the lower court was correct in holding
that the question of damages was moot, and not susceptable to legal determination.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has clearly presented to this Court a
detailed analysis of the law concerning the points raised
by Respondent in the lower court in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. An examination of the
various exhibits, and the record before this Court give
ample justification for affirming the decision of the
lower court in granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the following grounds:
1. The action was commenced against an improper
Defendant.
2. The cause of action is barred by the Utah Statute
of Limitations (Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
3. The fact that the Plaintiff having leased his property without any diminution in price to the owner of the
property through which the alleged right-of-way was to
be granted, makes the issue of damages either moot or
not susceptible to legal determination.
32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondent further asserts that the lower court
was correct in refusing to allow the Appellant to amend
his complaint by substituting or including new parties
defendant, and by adding a new cause of action. By virtue of the fact that the cause of action itself is barred by
the Statute of Limitations and Statute of Frauds, permitting Appellant to sue a different party would be of
no effect.
Respondent respectfully submits that this Court,
based on the facts and authorities presented in Respondent's Cross-Appeal, should rule that Respondent
was also entitled to a Summary Judgment on the
grounds that the preliminary negotiations between the
parties did not create a binding contract, and that the
alleged contract is void for failure to comply with the
Utah Statute of Frauds.
Respectfully submitted,
Wilford W. Kirton, J r .
Dan S. Bushnell
Richard R. Neslen
of and for
K I R T O N , McCONKIE, B O Y E R
& BOYLE
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent,
Cross-Appellant
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